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Regional Human Rights Systems
African Systems
African Commission Set to Review
Dissolution of Subregional Tribunal
The African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (the Commission)
agreed to hear a case brought by two
Zimbabwean farmers, Luke Tembani and
Ben Freeth, who allege that an August
2012 decision by the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) Summit
of Heads of State or Government (SADC
Summit) to dissolve the SADC Tribunal
(Tribunal) violates the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African
Charter). The Commission’s opinion will
determine whether, under the African
Charter and international norms, any of
the fifteen heads of state within the SADC
Summit, each named as a respondent in
the complaint, violated their obligations in
their roles creating policy direction for the
SADC. Thus before the case is even heard,
it sets a new precedent for individuals to
name multiple heads of state as respondents before an international body.
After Zimbabwe refused to comply
with a decision in Mike Campbell Ltd. and
Others v. Zimbabwe, in which the Tribunal
found in favor of farmers’ land rights, the
SADC Summit suspended the Tribunal
in 2010 to review its role. Although the
SADC’s Committee of Ministers of Justice
recommended reappointing and replacing
the Tribunal judges, the SADC Summit
decided in May 2011 to continue the
suspension and, later in 2012, to permanently dissolve the current Tribunal. The
SADC Summit has asked the Ministers
of Justice to write a new mandate for
a SADC Tribunal that would only hear
cases between States regarding the interpretation of the SADC Treaty and SADC
protocols. The previous Tribunal jurisdiction also encompassed the ability to hear
cases brought by individuals concerning
violations of human rights. Freeth’s father
and Tembani filed the complaint in Mike
Campbell under the old mandate but have
yet to receive compensation owed from
the ruling because the Tribunal’s suspension
also affected enforcement of previous
decisions.

Concurrently, other interested parties
in the region are also seeking to challenge
the dissolution of the Tribunal. Two nongovernmental organizations, the Southern
African Litigation Centre (SALC) and
the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU),
submitted a request, under Article 4 of
the Protocol to the African Charter on
the Establishment of an African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Protocol)
to the African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (the Court) for an advisory
opinion regarding the legitimacy of the
dissolution process. The NGOs make their
claim under the African Charter, the SADC
Tribunal Protocol, the SADC Treaty, the
UN Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary, and the UN Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations
of International Human Rights Law
and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law. With these documents,
the Court would decide if the actions
taken by the SADC Summit violated the
rights to justice, to effective remedies, and
to an independent judiciary. Although an
advisory opinion is not binding, the organizations hope that the SADC institutions
will take into account an advisory opinion issued by the Court since the SADC,
as a subregional economic community
(SEC), should make an effort to coordinate
policies with the African Union (AU), a
stated goal of the AU in Article 3 of its
Constitutive Act. As stated in the SADC
Treaty, the SADC means to take into
account the AU Constitutive Act including
the goals listed therein. However, the Court
would likely delay stepping into the issue
because under Article 4 of the Protocol, the
Court is barred from issuing an advisory
opinion if there is a case pending before
the Commission regarding the same matter, such as the case brought by Tembani
and Freeth.
If the petitioners are successful in either
the case pending before the Commission or
the request before the Court, the resulting
opinion could potentially affect both the
southern African region’s rule of law system as well as the strength of SECs’ adjudicatory mechanisms across the African
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continent. In dissolving the Tribunal and
denying any subsequent adjudicatory
body a human rights mandate, the SADC
Summit undermined the progress the fifteen Member States of SADC have made in
developing an effective rule-of-law system
and providing redress for individuals who
otherwise depend on inadequate domestic
courts. Supporting the SADC Tribunal
would also help the Commission or the
Court to show support for the other similarly organized SEC tribunals in Africa,
such as the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) Community
Court of Justice, thereby strengthening the
rule of law in the region.

ECOWAS Community Court
of Justice Holds Nigerian
Government Liable for Human
Rights Violations by Oil Companies
The Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) Community
Court of Justice (ECCJ), in a recent opinion, demanded that the Federal Republic
of Nigeria protect its citizens’ right to
an adequate environment favorable for
development. The ECCJ’s judgment in
SERAP v. The Federal Republic of Nigeria
on December 14, 2012, ordered Nigeria
to fix environmental damage in the Niger
Delta, protect against further environmental damage, and hold the perpetrators of
environmental damage accountable. The
plaintiffs, Socio-Economic Rights and
Accountability Project (SERAP), and the
ECCJ’s opinion cite oil companies as the
main perpetrators of environmental damage in the Niger Delta. The opinion connects the lack of enforcement of legislation
and regulations against oil companies in
Nigeria to degradation of the environment.
SERAP originally named seven oil companies as defendants in the complaint, but the
ECCJ ultimately found that it did not have
jurisdiction over them. However, under this
ruling, the ECCJ is requiring Nigeria to
enforce environmental regulations against
oil companies operating within Nigeria,
such as the Shell Petroleum Development
Company (Shell), thereby holding foreign companies liable for domestic human
rights violations.
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SERAP argued that international oil
companies have created an inadequate
standard of living through the pollution
of food and water. Two oil spills in 2001
and 2008 resulted in the contamination
of local rivers and creeks in Ogbobo
and Ogoniland from Shell-owned pipelines. Local water supplies were contaminated, causing the depletion of edible fish,
which the local community depends upon
for adequate food. Additionally, SERAP
argued that similar oil spills in the Niger
Delta have destroyed crops and the quality
of soil used in farming. As a result, poverty
in the area has increased as people’s livelihoods are destroyed. Therefore, SERAP
argued that the Nigerian government and
seven different oil companies violated the
right to an adequate standard of living, as
determined by adequate access to food,
water, healthcare, and a clean environment.
Although SERAP alleged that Nigeria
violated 29 articles from a variety of
international human rights instruments,
the ECCJ limited its judgment to Articles
1 and 24 of the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter).
Although Nigeria raised a preliminary challenge stating that the ECCJ could not rule
on instruments outside of the treaties, conventions, and protocols of ECOWAS, the
Court found that it could rule on violations
of other international instruments under
Article 1(h) of the Protocol on Democracy
and Good Governance (Protocol), which
allows for outside international human
rights instruments to govern the human
rights obligations of ECOWAS Member
States. However, the Court, determining
that many of the articles cited by the
plaintiffs were equivalent to each other,
found it could cite the article that affords
the best protection for the alleged violation. Therefore, the ECCJ focused on the
right to an adequate environment (Article
24) and States’ obligation to ensure rights
(Article 1).
The ECCJ’s decision reinforced the
duty of ECOWAS Member States to protect against environmental degradation by
oil companies that results in an inadequate
standard of living. Negative effects on
the environment due to the operations
of oil companies in the region has been
an ongoing issue in Nigeria as well as a
growing issue in other ECOWAS Member
States. With this decision, the ECCJ has
shown that it will hold Member States of
ECOWAS to their obligations to protect

the rights of citizens under Article 1 of
the African Charter, including by enforcing existing legislation — a step some
Member States are reluctant to take against
foreign companies. Furthermore, under
the decision, ECOWAS Member States are
responsible for the violations of human
rights by international companies operating within the state. The Nigerian government has a long history of permitting international oil companies to operate within
its borders: Shell has operated in Nigeria
since the 1930s. Therefore, the Nigerian
government may lack the necessary incentive to enforce the decision against oil
companies. Additionally, Nigeria has yet
to use its domestic implementation system
for ECCJ decisions. If the Nigerian government chooses not to enforce the ECCJ’s
ruling and hold oil companies liable, it
will set a counter-precedent for ECOWAS
Member States.
Brittany West, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human
Rights Brief.

European System
ECtHR Reinstates Ukrainian
Supreme Court Judge
For the first time in its history, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
ordered a Member State to reinstate a dismissed former judge. In its January 2013
judgment for Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine,
the ECtHR found that Ukraine violated
Article 6 (right to fair trial) and Article 8
(right to respect for private and family life)
of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) when the High Council
of Justice dismissed Supreme Court
Justice Oleksandr Volkov in May 2010
due to an alleged “breach of oath.” The
ECtHR ordered Ukraine to reinstate him
as a Supreme Court judge immediately.
Furthermore, in view of the serious systematic problems concerning the functioning of the Ukrainian judiciary, the Court,
under Articles 41 (just satisfaction) and 46
(binding force and execution of judgments),
recommended that Ukraine immediately
reform its system of judicial discipline.
Volkov became a Supreme Court judge
in 2003. In December 2007, he was elected
as a member of the High Council of
Justice, but the Parliamentary Committee
of the judiciary refused to allow him
66

to take the oath of office or assume his
duties. Two members of the High Council
of Justice conducted preliminary inquiries
in December 2008 and March 2009, looking into possible misconduct by Volkov.
According to the ECtHR, Volkov had failed
to recuse himself in cases concerning family members and had made, “gross procedural violations.” However, Volkov did not
have an opportunity to rebut these charges.
Following these inquiries, the President
of the High Council of Justice submitted
two applications to Parliament for Volkov’s
dismissal. In June 2010, Parliament voted
for Volkov’s dismissal for “breach of oath.”
Volkov subsequently challenged his dismissal before the Higher Administrative
Court (HAC), but that court found the
High Council of Justice’s dismissal had
been lawful and refused to re-consider.
In response to Volkov’s petition, the
ECtHR found four separate violations of the
Article 6 right to fair trial. First, the Court
held that the judicial bodies that had considered Volkov’s case were neither independent
nor impartial. The Court emphasized that
there were “structural deficiencies in the
proceedings before the High Council for
Justice,” including clear indications that a
number of members had personal biases
against Volkov. The Court further found that
Parliament’s hearing of the case increased
the politicization of the judicial process
and further inhibited the possibility of an
independent judiciary and separation of
powers. Furthermore, the review of the case
by the Higher Administrative Court did not
remedy these defects.
The ECtHR additionally found that
Ukraine breached the principle of legal
certainty by not limiting the period of
review for the proceedings against Volkov.
By violating fair voting practices through
casting multiple ballots, the Court held
that the Ukrainian parliament violated the
Ukrainian Constitution and other legislation and therefore the principle of legal
certainty. The ECtHR found a violation
of the Article 8 right to privacy because
the Court deemed Volkov’s dismissal to be
inconsistent with domestic law as well an
impermissible interference with his private
and professional life. Because Ukraine had
not established guidelines or normative
practices establishing a consistent interpretation of the notion of “breach of oath,”
the procedure lacked adequate procedural
safeguards to prevent arbitrary use.
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In conclusion, the Court found that the
serious systemic problems resulted from
the failure to organize the judicial branch
to ensure sufficient separation of powers.
The Court faulted the Ukrainian judiciary system for not providing sufficient
“guarantees against abuse and misuse of
disciplinary measures,” and found that this
failure undermines the entire Ukrainian
democracy. To remedy these violations,
the ECtHR ordered Ukraine to carry out
reform of the judicial discipline system,
including legislative reform to help create
sufficient separation of the judiciary from
other branches of state power.

by the state. Section 2 of Article 8 specifies that public authority cannot interfere
with this right unless it “is in accordance
with the law and is necessary [. . .] for the
protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.” Thus, relying on ECHR Article
8 right to privacy of family life and the
home, the siblings argued that their deportation to Pakistan would break their strong
ties with Norway where they had lived
since childhood. They argued further that
their links to Pakistan were weak since their
mother died in 2007 and they had not been
in contact with their father since 1996.

The ECtHR’s order and competence
to reinstate judges based on the violation
of the right to a fair trial and the right to
respect for private life found in this case
demonstrate the scope and outreach a decision of the ECtHR potentially holds. By
insisting upon an independent judiciary
and fair proceedings, the Court’s decision
can help propel necessary legal reforms
and limit detrimental political influences.
A politically independent national judiciary is a critical tool, necessary for the
protection of human rights in countries.

In similar cases in front of the ECtHR,
the Court deferred to the state if the petitioner had acted fraudulently. However,
in Butt v. Norway the ECtHR held that
the siblings could not be held responsible
for the illicit conduct of their mother so
long as they were unaware of their illegal
status in Norway. Given these “exceptional
circumstances,” the Court expanded its
protection for children’s rights and held
that, “exceptional circumstances” could
make it necessary to put the interests of
the children first, implying that a parent might need to be granted residence
as well. To protect children’s rights, the
Court articulated that the child’s individual
circumstances must be taken into account
when deciding if a child should bear the
negative consequences of parental action.
In this case, given that the mother had died,
the Court found little possibility of future
exploitation of the immigration system.
Furthermore, given that the children had
strong interest in staying in Norway due to
their strong social ties, such as their family
and obtaining an education, the Court found
that this satisfied the standards for “family life” and “private life” encompassed in
Article 8.

Heighted Protection for Children
in Immigration Proceedings
Affirmed by ECtHR
The European Court of Human Rights
(EctHR) ruled in Butt v. Norway that
the State violated the right to respect
for private and family life protected by
Article 8 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) by withdrawing residence permits of two Pakistani
siblings. The December 4, 2012, ECtHR
decision affirmed a heightened standard of
protection for children in immigration proceedings by expanding the possible range
of exceptional circumstances under which
Article 8 concerns outweigh state policy.
Siblings Johangir Abbas Butt and Fozia
Butt received humanitarian residence
permits from Norway in 1992. However,
Norwegian immigration withdrew the permits in 1999 because their mother failed
to disclose that the family had returned to
live in Pakistan from 1992 to 1996. Since
returning, the siblings have lived intermittently with their aunt and uncle, legal residents of Norway.
Article 8 of the ECHR offers general
protection of a person’s private life, family
life, and home from arbitrary interference

Thus, Butt v. Norway expanded the
principles of previous judgments regarding children’s rights protected by Article
8 under the doctrine of “exceptional circumstances” under which the rights of the
individual rise above those of the state’s
immigration policy needs. In this case, the
Court has created a new exception under
“exceptional circumstances” for the protection of children even when a parent acts
fraudulently in immigration proceedings.
Because culpability cannot begin before
a child gains knowledge, States must now
consider their age and mental awareness
of their immigration status. In essence, the
67

Court has recognized that under Article 8
children cannot be legally responsible or
deported based solely on the mistakes of
their parents.
Future cases will prove whether the
Court will fully embraces the high standard of the Butt case and acknowledge the
relevance of ties with the receiving State
as well as the children’s lack of knowledge
about their precarious residency status.
Although the essential object of Article 8
of the ECHR is to protect the individual
against arbitrary action by public authorities, Article 8 implies positive obligations
inherent in effective “respect” for family life, particularly in immigration and
asylum issues. This case suggests that
this positive obligation requires States to
pay closer attention to exceptional circumstance factors such as the extent to
which family life is effectively ruptured,
the extent of the child’s ties in the contracting State, whether there are insurmountable obstacles in the way of the family
living in the country of origin, and whether
there are factors of immigration control or
considerations of public order weighing in
favor of a child.
Antonia Latsch, an L.L.M. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.

Inter-American System
Inter-American Court of Human
Rights Rules Against Costa
Rica’s Absolute Ban on In-Vitro
Fertilization
In a case touching on the right to
life of an embryo, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) ruled in
November 2012 that an absolute ban of invitro fertilization (IVF) violates the right
to privacy, the right to family, and the right
to personal integrity. In 2000, Costa Rica
became the first country to pass a total ban
on IVF, citing a concern for the right to life
contained in the Costa Rican Constitution
and the American Convention on Human
Rights. In response, nine infertile couples
brought a petition against Costa Rica to the
Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR). The case, Murillo et
al. v. Costa Rica, was transferred to the
IACtHR, which agreed with the petitioners and the Commission that the absolute
ban on the use of IVF procedures violates
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the rights to privacy, to family, and to personal integrity. In addition, the IACtHR
interpreted the meaning of the right to
life provision contained in the American
Convention by clarifying that the right to
life does not stand alone and independent
of other rights.
In 1995, Costa Rica’s Ministry of
Health authorized the use of IVF and
between 1995 and 2000 fifteen babies were
born through the procedure. In response to
IVF’s authorization, a petitioner filed a
claim alleging that the use of IVF was
unconstitutional. In 2000, Costa Rica’s
Supreme Court held that IVF violated the
right to life and human dignity provisions of
the country’s constitution, and also Article 4
(right to life) of the American Convention.
The country’s highest court held that life
begins at conception and thus any intentional or accidental discarding or mishandling of embryos violated the right to life.
Article 4 of the American Convention
states: “Every person has the right to
have his life respected. This right shall be
protected by law and, in general, from the
moment of conception. No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his life.” However,
until now, the “moment of conception”
language has been undefined. In deciding on the Costa Rican case, the IACtHR
noted its status as the ultimate interpretative authority on the American Convention
and ruled that personal integrity, personal
liberty, privacy, and right to a family outweighed some of the nuanced interpretations offered by Costa Rica on the reach
of the right to life provision. In particular,
the Court focused on the right of couples
to start a family (Article 17) and the right
to privacy (Article 11). The Court noted
that both provisions touch on reproductive
health and access to necessary technologies in order to have children.
The Court did not shy away from
Article 4 and the right to life but made a
careful analysis as to the interpretation of
the words “in general” and “conception.” In
describing the IVF procedure, the IACtHR
noted that scientific literature talks about
two distinct moments, implantation and
fertilization, and reasoned that only upon
completing the cycle of fertilization can
conception exist. The Court interpreted
this to mean that if fertilization is required
for formation of the zygote (the fertilized egg created from the union of ovum
and sperm), then non-implanted embryos

could never realize their full development
and thus the Court determined that the
rights of those embryos are null. Therefore,
the Court held, conception cannot occur
before implantation and the right to life
protections cannot apply to non-implanted
embryos. The Court reasoned that the “in
general” wording allowed for this interpretation. Accordingly, the IACtHR held that
Costa Rica’s Supreme Court failed to consider other rights affected by an absolute
ban on IVF, which resulted in an arbitrary
and excessive intrusion into private and
family life, with disproportionate impacts
on certain groups; as a result, the interference had a discriminatory impact.
The Court also agreed with the petitioners that the absolute ban unfairly discriminated against poorer families due to the
prohibitive cost of travel for couples without
financial means. The Court added that the
ban had a particular discriminatory effect on
women who were already undergoing IVF
treatment when the ban was instituted.
The decision could have important
impacts throughout the Americas region
because the Court’s decisions are binding on all countries that have ratified
the Court’s contentious jurisdiction. Since
announcing that the Court’s decision was
forthcoming, both sides have presented
arguments as to whether Article 4’s right
to life provision begins at conception and
includes embryos. Some argued that if
the Court ruled in favor of the petitioners,
then the decision would open the door for
changes to laws concerning contraception,
abortion laws, and research on humans.
Among the reparations ordered by
the Court are that Costa Rica re-institute
access to IVF, offer counseling to plaintiffs, and slowly incorporate access to IVF
into its health system through its social
security programs. Costa Rica has said it
will comply with the Court’s decision and
allow in-vitro fertilization again.

Inter-American Commission
Increasingly Requesting
Precautionary Measures for Cuba
A disproportionate number of requests
for precautionary measures granted by the
Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR) in 2012 were for Cuban
citizens. Of the 26 total precautionary
measures requested by the Commission,
five were focused on the island nation. The
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requested measures focused primarily on
the protection of human rights defenders
and the situation inside Cuba’s prisons.
Precautionary measures and annual
reports represent the limited options
available to the Inter-American System
of Human Rights (IASHR) to engage
with Cuba. In 1962 the Organization of
American States (OAS) excluded Cuba
from participating due to its Marxistleaning government, which the OAS cited
as “incompatible with the principles and
objectives of the Inter-American System.”
In 2009, the OAS reopened lines of communication with Cuba but left it to Cuba
to initiate dialogue. Thus, until and when
Cuba decides to strengthen its relationship
and discourse with the OAS structure, the
IASHR has limited reach in its enforcement
of human rights in Cuba. However, Article
23 of the IACHR Rules of Procedure states
that anyone legally recognized by an OAS
Member State may bring a petition to the
Commission and ask that the American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
Man apply. Furthermore, Article 51 of the
Rules establishes that the Commission may
examine any petition of alleged violations
in light of the American Declaration for
states that are not a party to the American
Convention. Cuba is not a signatory to the
American Convention on Human Rights,
but the general principles and customary international norms enshrined in the
American Declaration may be applied
to Cuba due to their OAS membership.
Hence, requests for precautionary measures and annual reports remain available
through the Commission.
The Commission is the first entrance
into the IASHR, and where a party believes
that protective interim measures are necessary to prevent irreparable harm, they may
request that the Commission encourage a
state to adopt precautionary measures so
as to protect people or subject matter of a
pending case. Since 2010, there has been
an increase in the number of precautionary
measures the Commission has urged Cuba
to adopt. Other countries, such as Mexico
and Colombia, are consistently on the list
of most precautionary measures requested,
but Cuba’s presence has increased from
only two granted requests in 2010 to four
granted precautionary measures in 2011
and five in 2012. This increase may, in
part, relate to Cuba’s recent re-introduction
into the IASHR.
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From 2010 to 2012, requests for precautionary measures centered on two key
topics: treatment inside Cuba’s prison system and protection against discrimination
based on one’s political thoughts and associations. The Commission’s most recent
2011 annual report included a chapter on
Cuba in which the Commission extensively discussed the situation for human
rights defenders and political dissidents in
Cuba; imprisonment was addressed only as
related to those issues.
In all cases, the Commission requested
that Cuba reach an agreement with the
beneficiary of the precautionary measures
and report back to the Commission on
progress toward investigating facts and
protecting the person involved. Notably,

the Commission itself generally makes
clear that issuance of a precautionary
measure does not prejudge that a human
rights violation has occurred. In the past,
Cuba has acted on some of the precautionary measure requests, such as the release
of an epileptic woman from prison, while
others have gone unanswered, such as the
continued imprisonment of political dissident Sonia Garro. Cuba’s response to more
recent requests is unknown.
Debate exists as to the legitimacy of
the Commission’s use of interim measures.
Article 63 of the American Convention
expressly dictates that the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has the
power to issue provisional measures in cases
of extreme gravity and urgency. However,
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the Convention makes no corresponding
reference regarding the Commission’s
ability to issue interim measures. Yet,
under Article 25 of the Commission’s
own governing Rules of Procedure, the
Commission has established that it too
has the power to issue interim measures
to protect against irreparable harm. The
Commission derives this power from the
its duty to ensure compliance with state’s
commitments, outlined in Article 18 of the
Commission’s Statute, and also based on
the Commission’s functions as outlined in
Article 41 of the American Convention.
Jessica Alatorre, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human
Rights Brief.

